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Abstract
This article considers the involvement of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany at the 1939 
New York World’s Fair. It considers the form, function, and content of the Italian Pavil-
ion designed for this fair and asserts that the prefabricated monumental structure 
would be best interpreted, not in isolation, but as an element of the larger architec-
tural conversation which continued to unfold across contemporary fascist Europe. 
Such reconsideration of this building makes it possible to evaluate the relationship 
between Fascist design, the assertion of political will, and the articulation of national 
identity and cultural heritage within a larger, transnational context. The author also 
investigates the American exhibition committee’s earnest and persistent, yet ultimate-
ly unheeded, solicitation of Nazi German participation and argues that motives be-
hind German withdrawal from this event had as much to do with the threat of popular 
protest as economic pressure.
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Two years after pioneering American journalist Anne O’Hare McCormick la-
belled the ideologically-charged national exhibitions of the 1937 International 
Exposition in Paris ‘Temples of Propaganda’ (Figure  1), the world turned its 
gaze to a similar event held in Flushing, New York.1 There, further ‘national 
1 Anne O’Hare McCormick, ‘Europe: National Exhibitionism at Paris Fair,’ New York Times, July 
24, 1937, 14.
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projections’ similarly dedicated to demonstrating ‘superior efficiency, ingenu-
ity and power’ would once again be on full display while geopolitical and mili-
tary tensions continued to mount from Munich to Mongolia.
The 1939 World’s Fair was one of several such international expositions to be 
held during the interwar period and was attended by representatives of both 
National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy. The rhetorical capacity of these 
events should not be underestimated. Over six months in 1937, more than thir-
ty-one million visitors came into contact with Albert Speer’s German pavilion 
in Paris. Two years later, more than forty-five million were treated to the Fascist 
interpretation of Italian ‘classical-modern’ design at Michele Busiri Vici’s Pavil-
ion in New York.2 Such international expositions offered participants a signifi-
cant rhetorical platform and provided space for countries in a rapidly changing 
postwar world to present a coherent, undoubtedly idealized, self-image 
through an astoundingly diverse range of displays. In this way, national identi-
ties that had been challenged, reinforced, or even forged as a consequence of 
2 As described by the Italian-authored News Release no. 328 with regard to its national pavilion 
at the 1939 New York World’s Fair. ‘Italy folders, Countries files, Foreign Participation Depart-
ment subseries, Government Department series,’ New York World’s Fair 1939–1940 records. 
Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and Tilden 
Foundations (hereafter: nywf-nypl).
Figure 1 Postcard album, Paris 1937: Promenade à Travers l’Exposition, Série 3 [Promenade 
around the Exposition, Series 3], H. Chipault, Boulogne-sur-Seine, France, 
distributor. The Wolfsonian–Florida International University, Miami Beach, 
Florida, Gift of Michael Weintraub, Photo by Lynton Gardiner.
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the First World War were given (almost) equal opportunity to project a certain 
status or role within a large field of government-sponsored peer-exhibitors.3
While each participating country made bold display of its reimagined role 
within the global community, the utopian mood of these fairs also made it pos-
sible for the new regimes of certain nations to promote, and effectively nor-
malize, their self-styled ‘totalitarian’ form of rule. This process was facilitated 
by the explicit invitation to construct national pavilions and exhibition areas 
which would engage, encourage, and even educate an international public. 
Through this personal interaction with Baudrillardian hyperrealistic represen-
tations of national identity and cultural heritage, both the Fascist and National 
Socialist programs sought to mediate their renegotiated place within the new 
world order.4 The erection of imposing national pavilions on a global stage 
figured to be part of each regime’s strategy to assert itself as a popularly- 
supported government whose political project was to be taken seriously, 
 respected, and even admired. These expositions offered both regimes an op-
portunity to demonstrate to the world that they were the rightful stewards and 
genetic heirs to a revived civilization comparable to that of a glorious antiquity 
which it had cynically resurrected in various ways.5 Such exploitative measures 
rendered the international exhibitions, once celebrated for their ability to uni-
fy, a grand forum for the type of political and ideological posturing which pre-
cipitated a second wave of world conflict.
The Fascist and National Socialist material contributions to the world’s fairs 
of the interwar period have already generated some scholarly discussion. As 
Marla Stone has recently noted, the medium of an exhibition, for its ‘ability to 
direct the gaze, propagandize any message, control the narrative (and) regu-
late emotions’ served as ‘a central weapon in the National Socialist and Fascist 
cultural crusade.’6 Yet surprisingly little attention has been drawn to Italian 
and German involvement in the 1939 World’s Fair, and even less to the contro-
versial American efforts to ensure Nazi participation. The widespread atten-
tion these international negotiations came to inspire, their influence on the 
3 To be sure, media and spectator attention depended, at least in part, on the size and position 
of a given country’s exposition space within the fairgrounds, as well as the current cultural or 
political appeal of the country.
4 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser, (Ann Arbor: Univer-
sity of Michigan Press, 1994), 12–14.
5 See Helen Roche and Kyriakos Demetriou, ed., Brill’s Companion to the Classics, Fascism and 
Nazi Ideology (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2018).
6 Marla Stone, ‘Collaboration and Conflict: The Wartime Culture of Display in Fascist Italy and 
Nazi Germany,’ Paper presented at the Comparing the Cultural History of Fascist Italy and 
Nazi Germany International Workshop, Freie Universität Berlin, March 2019.
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Reich’s ultimate refusal to participate, and the simultaneous success of the 
Italian exhibition at this event remains underexplored. This article will extend 
the relevant body of scholarship in a variety of necessary directions and look 
to the 1939 fair as a way to begin to gauge the transatlantic response to what 
can be described as a globalized fascism of the interwar period. It will assess 
the design and reception of the Italian pavilion at the 1939 New York World’s 
Fair alongside the private dealings between representatives of Grover  Whalen’s 
World’s Fair Corporation and National Socialist Germany which ultimately 
came to renege on an early commitment to participate. While demonstrating 
that representatives of each regime were well aware of the significance of this 
world’s fair, this study will also reveal an interesting divergence in American 
popular opinion with regard to Fascist and National Socialist participation. In 
arguing that participation in this event was a critical element of Fascist Italy’s 
campaign to win the respect and admiration of foreign opinion through assert-
ing cultural dominance, the article will also assert that it was negative public 
opinion, at least as much as any financial concerns, which ultimately triggered 
the Third Reich’s refusal to participate as originally planned. While Fascist Italy 
was able to use the 1939 New York World’s Fair to advance its already well-pro-
moted and generally well-received cultural agenda, Nazi Germany was,  despite 
efforts of the fair’s lead organizers, effectively shut out by popular indignation 
and threats of high-profile embarrassment.
This article briefly considers the general dynamics of the 1939 New York 
World’s Fair in order to contextualize its more detailed overview of the ori-
gins, aims, and processes by which the fair was organized. It then explores 
Italian involvement in the fair, beginning with an assessment of Fascist It-
aly’s aims in participating and ending with a detailed study of the Italian 
 pavilion itself in order to make sense of its role within the greater Fascist 
cultural and diplomatic program. The study then moves into a discussion of 
the process by which Germany withdrew from its contractually guaranteed 
commitment to participate and considers the various reasons for its change 
in course before a final section draws comparative conclusions regarding the 
geopolitical consequences of the relationship maintained by each regime to 
this particular fair.
1 Contextualizing the 1939 New York World’s Fair
The ideologically-charged aesthetic confrontation between nationalistic re-
gimes at the 1937 Paris Exposition has been the subject of several other recent 
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studies by historians such as Karen Fiss, Ihor Junyk and Danilo Udovicki-Sleb.7 
Yet scholarship has unduly neglected to consider the dynamics which came to 
shape the 1939 fair in New York, where somewhat similar patterns of appease-
ment and political miscalculation once again proved decisive. The later event 
remained open nearly twice as long as its European predecessor and actually 
bridged the temporal expanse between the ‘Phoney War’ and the German inva-
sion of Poland in September 1939. Sponsored by the United States government, 
the last fair to be held until 1947 played host to sixty foreign governments and 
allotted highly coveted exhibition space to thirty-three nations over sixteen 
months. Thus, while prior studies have either offered a general overview of the 
event in terms of its recreational or commercial appeal8 or chosen to consider 
the event from a more nation-specific angle, this article offers a comparative 
study of the relationship maintained to the New York fair by the two largest 
fascist states to have accepted the official invitation to participate.9 Such a ste-
reoscopic approach will build off the recent work of scholars such as Bianca 
Gaudenzi, Christian Fuhrmeister, and Marla Stone in an effort to improve our 
understanding of the interplay between Fascist and National Socialist cultural, 
commercial, and political (in this case specifically diplomatic) policy.10 
7 Karen Fiss, Grand Illusion: The Third Reich, the Paris Exposition, and the Cultural Seduction 
of France (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Ihor Junyk, ‘The Face of the Na-
tion: State Fetishism and “Métissage” at the Exposition Internationale, Paris 1937,’ Grey 
Room 33 (2006): 96–120; Danilo Udovicki-Sleb, ‘Facing Hitler’s Pavilion: The Uses of Mo-
dernity in the Soviet Pavilion at the 1937 Paris International Exhibition,’ Journal of Con-
temporary History 47 (2012): 13–47.
8 See Helen Harrison, Joseph Cusker, ed., Dawn of a New Day: The New York World’s Fair, 
1939–40 (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
9 Francoist Spain rejected its invitation outright while the Greek Metaxas regime enjoyed a 
fairly popular showing, wasting no time in commissioning the construction of a classically- 
inflected modern structure to house its many imported archaeological exhibits. Salazar’s 
Portugal also participated, and the national pavilion designed by Antonio Lopez and 
Jorge Segurado, though adorned with an overabundance of rather gratuitous arches, con-
tained museum-style exhibits related to the purported Portuguese glories of the sixteenth 
century. See Countries files, Foreign Participation Department subseries, Government 
Participation, nywf-nypl.
10 See Bianca Gaudenzi, ‘Tra autarchia e vita comoda: La politicizzazione della comunicazi-
one commerciale nella Germania nazionalsocialista e nell’Italia fascista,’ in Stefano 
Cavazza and Filippe Triola, ed., Parole sovrane: Comunicazione politica e storia contempo-
ranea in Italia e Germania (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2017), 135–156; Bianca Gaudenzi, ‘Dictators 
for Sale: The Commercialisation of the Duce and the Führer in Fascist Italy and Nazi Ger-
many,’ in Rewriting German History: New perspectives on modern Germany, ed. Jan Rüger 
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 Consideration of the (eventually) divergent responses of these two allied re-
gimes to the official invitation to participate in a truly global and, at least su-
perficially, amicable event can aid our understanding of not only the specific 
fair, historical actors, or period in question, but also the broader relationship 
maintained by each regime to the court of global opinion. What were the lim-
its, both temporal and geographic, to fascist iconographic materiality, and how 
penetrative were Fascist or National Socialist ideals in a global, as opposed to 
national or regional, context?11
Though the official dealings explored in this article between organizers of 
the fair and Nazi Germany were largely private in nature, archival evidence 
suggests that these American overtures in fact became something of an open 
secret and inspired a wave of popular criticism directed toward both the Nazi 
regime and fair organizers. Very recent scholarship maintains that despite the 
desire of ‘Wiedemann, Speer, and many others’ to ‘follow up the Reich’s suc-
cess at Paris with a barnstorming performance on the other side of the Atlan-
tic’, it was Hitler himself who vetoed German participation in the 1939 event 
out of concern over the economic viability of such an undertaking.12 Yet we 
and Nikolaus Wachsmann (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2015), 267–287; Christiaan Fuhr-
meister, Johannes Griebel, Stephan Klingen and Ralf Peters, ed., Kunsthistoriker im Krieg: 
Deutscher Militärischer Kunstschutz in Italien 1943–1945 (Köln: Böhlau, 2012). Marla Stone, 
‘Collaboration and Conflict: The Wartime Culture of Display in Fascist Italy and Nazi Ger-
many,’ Paper presented at the the Comparing the Cultural History of Fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany International Workshop, Freie Universität Berlin, March 2019.
11 For an insightful survey of various forms of fascist iconographic materiality, see Valentina 
Follo, ‘The Power of Images in the Age of Mussolini’ (PhD diss., University of Pennsylva-
nia, 2013), chapter 2 and 4. The title of Follo’s dissertation appears to pay tribute to Paul 
Zanker’s influential The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1987). For an analysis of the form and content of what Marla Stone has 
referred to as ‘the most enduring propaganda event of the fascist dictatorship’ see Marla 
Stone, ‘Staging Fascism: The Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution,’ Journal of Contempo-
rary History 28 (1993): 215–243. For more general discussions of classically inflected Italian 
Fascist iconographic materiality see Antonio La Penna, ‘La rivista Roma e l’Istituto di 
Studi Romani: Sul culto della romanità nel periodo fascista,’ in Antike und Altertumswis-
senschaft in der Zeit von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus, ed. Beat Näf (Mandel-
bachtal: Cicero, 2001); and Flavia Marcello, ‘Building the Image of Power: Images of Ro-
manità in the Civic Architecture of Fascist Italy,’ in Brill’s Companion to the Classics, Fascist 
Italy and Nazi Germany, ed. Helen Roche and Kyriakos Demetriou (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 
2018), 325–369.
12 Brendan Simms, Hitler: Only the World Was Enough (London: Penguin, 2019), 295. 
 Significantly, while Simms cites Fritz Wiedemann’s memoirs Der Mann, der Feldherr 
werden wollte: Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen des Vorgesetzten Hitlers im 1. Weltkrieg und seines 
späteren persönlichen Adjutanten (Kettwig: Blick und Bild Verlag für Politische Bildung, 1964), 
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must be very cautious about taking the Reich’s claims over its financial insecu-
rities at face value. As the regime would have known full-well in the spring of 
1938, such discourse about the Nazi state’s lack of foreign credits shifts focus 
away from the furor caused by earlier announcements of German participa-
tion. While the problem of foreign spending was a legitimate concern at this 
time, the popular uproar caused by its planned participation contributed 
equally to Nazi disinclination. Indeed, as Brendan Simms has also pointed out, 
both the Propaganda Ministry and Foreign Office came to advise against par-
ticipation in an event which would leave the Party vulnerable to ‘grandstand-
ing’ critics such as Fiorello La Guardia within ‘the belly of the capitalist and 
Jewish beast.’13 Yet the Foreign Office was also quick to note that the fair was to 
be hosted by the federal government and organized, not by the city of New 
York, but by ‘a private society whose president is very well-disposed to us.’14 By 
attributing its withdrawal solely to a lack of foreign credits and insurmount-
able trade tariffs, the Reich was able to draft its own narrative and cast itself as 
the victim of discriminatory transatlantic tariffs and global economy even 
though the maximum dollar value the Reich ever needed to secure had been 
capped (by its own volition) at $1.5 million.15 Significantly, by 1940 Germany’s 
$387 billion gdp value was more than double that of its transalpine ally which 
sat at $147 billion.16 Yet Fascist Italy had long established itself as an eager, if 
sometimes overeager, international exhibitor. After furnishing the Chicago 
Century of Progress with a surplus of exhibition material, Italy continued to 
spend lavishly on international opportunities for self-representation and had 
even begun to devote an inestimable amount of resources to its own 1942 
 international exposition (hereafter referred to as the ‘E.U.R.’ [Esposizione 
222–223, the records of the Auswärtiges Amt related to the 1939 New York World’s Fair 
(R901/106932-7) make no mention of Speer or his offices, indicating something of a dis-
connect between the Reich’s cultural and diplomatic policy. Speer’s main official preoc-
cupation remained that of General Building Inspector through the onset of war and was 
not appointed Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production until after the death of 
Fritz Todt in February 1942. For more on Speer’s influence on Nazi architectural policy and 
the competition amongst party draftsmen following the death of Paul Ludwig Troost, see 
Magnus Brechtken, Albert Speer: Eine deutsche Karriere (Munich: Siedler, 2017), 73.
13 Simms, Hitler, 295.
14 Record of meeting concerning German participation in the exhibition in New York. 
 Berlin, 13 April 1938. Records of the Federal Foreign Office, R901/114753 Bundesarchiv- 
Lichterfelde, Berlin.
15 Ibid.
16 Christian Goeschel, Mussolini and Hitler: The Forging of the Fascist Alliance (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2018), 179, 233.
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 Universale Roma]) intended to outpace even the 1939 New York event in scope 
and scale.17
2 Constructive Comparisons
Although many fairgoers were boldly opposed to ancillary endorsement, or 
(the even hypothetical) exhibition of the type of National Socialist materiali-
ties put on bold display in Paris, both the popular and critical response to the 
Fascist-sponsored Italian pavilion proved positive. Even in the wake of its ever-
expanding record of diplomatically destructive behavior (the invasion of 
 Abyssinia in October 1935, formal withdrawal from the League of Nations in 
December 1937, and adoption of anti-Semitic racial laws in November 1938), 
the regime’s invitation to exhibit itself in New York City went largely unchal-
lenged. This discrepancy is significant to our historical understanding of Euro-
pean  fascism’s prewar global sociocultural currency. In the first serious and 
consequential attempt to consider both of Fascism and National Socialism to-
gether, Roger Griffin not only acknowledges the value of comparative analysis, 
but explains that as a political program, fascism depended upon a spiritual 
renewal made possible by cultural regeneration.18 Griffin’s comparative con-
sideration of the palingenetic rebirth of both Italy and Germany pushed for-
ward the existing body of scholarship which hitherto seemed content to evalu-
ate the narratives which framed the cultural and material production of each 
regime in isolation. This, consequentially, led to the understanding that the 
rush by a ‘spiritually renewed’ Italy and Germany to rebuild and rebrand them-
selves as culturally superior imperial entities evidences the existence of pro-
found insecurities regarding national prestige throughout the first several 
years of their rule. This is borne out in the extensive cultural programs of 
each  party, which, alongside commitments to policies of hygiene, organiza-
tion, potency, and racial purity, represented considerable components of 
 fascism’s  restorative mission. Such systematic, long-term goals fit quite natu-
rally alongside that imperial zeal which underpinned an increasing bellicosi-
ty  and disdain for diplomacy. What value, then, did such temporary fora 
hold for nascent governments and the entwined, nationalized artistic impulse 
17 For a discussion of Italy’s overeager participation at the 1933 Chicago Century of Progress 
Exposition see Cheryl Ganz, The 1933 Chicago World’s Fair: A Century of Progress (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2008), 134.
18 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London: Routledge, 1991), 32.
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they sought to nurture and cast as an extension of their enlightened political 
systems?
To answer such a question, it is best to consider the prefabricated Fascist 
structure which dominated the Italian national pavilion at the 1939 World’s 
Fair (Figure 2) part of the larger architectural conversation which continued to 
unfold across contemporary fascist Europe. Reevaluation of this structure in 
the section entitled ‘The Italian Pavilion’ will make it possible to consider the 
relationship between state design and the assertion of political will, national 
identity, and cultural heritage within a larger, transnational context. In this 
way, such an approach should also supplement the growing debate regarding 
the totalitarian deployment of state-sponsored architecture and design as 
tools of propagandistic persuasion. Although studies of the larger Fascist and 
National Socialist architectural programs abound, there has been little attempt 
to draw a link between these classically-inflected domestic or colonial projects 
Figure 2 Italian Pavilion built for the 1939 New York World’s Fair (from the Official Catalog 
of the Italian pavilion published by the General Commissioner of Italy, 1939).
Source: L’Italia all’Esposizione Universale di New-York 1940 (Rome: 
Commissario Generale d’Italia, 1940), cover page.
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and those of ambassadorial design build at foreign world’s fairs.19 As a critical 
arm of the Party’s ideological messaging apparatus, this program was defined 
by cultural arbiters of the regime as ‘the expression of the new artistic climate 
that is forming in Italy . . . a sign of the orientations, the revisions, and the real-
izations . . . of all the spiritual forces of an era’s artists, to fix in a single building 
a moment in the civilization of a people, to pass down to the ages.’20 Such a 
description suggests that in its fluidity, Fascist design was intended to reflect 
the ‘dynamic’ nature of the larger cultural program on which it so heavily re-
lied. In blending ‘robust modernity and an affirmative stance towards progress’ 
with ‘dreams of the past’, the historicist eclecticism of Fascist Italy’s design pro-
gram also mirrored the ‘high technological romanticism’ Thomas Mann once 
identified in National Socialist Germany.21 Yet there remains a degree of hesita-
tion on behalf of architectural, cultural, and social historians of this period to 
19 For a discussion of the Nazi domestic building program, see Alex Scobie, Hitler’s State 
Architecture (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990); or Helmut Weihs-
mann, Bauen unterm Hakenkreuz: Architektur des Untergangs (Vienna: Promedia, 1998). 
Though light on analysis, Weihsmann’s work remains the most comprehensive ‘field 
guide’ to the National Socialist building program. Nerdinger and Tafel’s similar book offers 
greater context but has less to say about the buildings constructed between 1933–1945. 
See Winfried Nerdinger, Cornelius Tafel, Guida all’architettura del Novecento Germania 
(Milan: Electa, 1996). For a similarly uncritical, but expansive survey of the regime’s archi-
tectural output, see also Jost Dülffer, Josef Henke, and Jochen Thies, Hitlers Städte: Bau-
politik im Dritten Reich: Eine Dokumentation (Böhlau: Vienna, 1978). For a discussion of the 
Fascist domestic building program, see especially Paolo Nicoloso, Architetture per 
un’identità italiana (Udine; Gaspari, 2012); and Aristotle Kallis, The Third Rome, 1922–43: 
The Making of the Fascist Capital (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014). For a discussion of 
Italian colonial architecture see Mia Fuller, Moderns Abroad: Architecture, Cities, and Ital-
ian Imperialism (London: Routledge, 2006). For a discussion of the prefabricated struc-
tures designed for a Fascist exhibition of the ‘Italian Colonial Empire’ held in Naples in 
1938, see Giovanni Arena, ‘The Last Exhibition of the Italian Colonial Empire: Naples 
1938–40,’ in Cultures of International Exhibitions 1840–1940: Great Exhibitions in the Mar-
gins, ed. Marta Filipovà (Burlington: Ashgate, 2015), 312–332.
20 È l’espressione del nuovo clima artistico che si è andato formando in Italia. È una segnalazi-
one di orientamenti, di revisioni, di realizzazioni, che può valere anche per tutte le altre arti, 
per le quali sono difficili gli accentramenti, di tutte le forze spirituali degli artisti di un’epoca, 
per fermare in un sol blocco un momento della civiltà di un popolo da tramandare ai secoli. 
F. S. Palozzi, Il nuovo stile littorio: I progetti per il Palazzo del Littorio e della Mostra della 
Rivoluzione Fascista in via dell’Impero (Milan: S.A. Arti Grafiche Bertarelli, 1936), vii. Quot-
ed in Andrew Manson, ‘Rationalism and Ruins in Roma Mussoliniana: The 1934 Palazzo 
del Littorio Competition’ (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2015), 16–17.
21 Quoted in Martin Kitchen, Speer: Hitler’s Architect (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2015), 37; Konrad Jarausch, Out of Ashes: A New History of Europe in the Twentieth Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 263.
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consider the world’s fair structures as an extension of the regime’s larger do-
mestic building program. If, as generations of scholars have suggested, the aim 
of those domestic projects was to aestheticize politics street by street and ar-
ticulate the will of the party through the strategic distribution of massive, over-
powering, classically-inflected designs, then there is no reason to discount the 
role of the national pavilions built to persuade abroad.
3 Planning the 1939 New York World’s Fair
In its quest to organize the second American-based global exposition of the 
decade, Grover Whalen’s World’s Fair Corporation successfully managed to 
earn federal support, and with the passing of Congressman Sol Bloom’s Public 
Act #105, invitations to foreign governments were formally issued by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt himself in 1936. Whalen, a former prohibition-era Police 
Commissioner known as much for his charisma as for his abject brutality, was 
president of New York-based Shenley Distilleries when he began shopping his 
vision for a renewed take on the World’s Fair project.22
It is unknown just how familiar Whalen’s organization might have been 
with the geopolitical dynamics and organizational difficulties which tainted 
the Paris Exposition by its close in November 1937. Still, however, the ways in 
which the American organizers perceived of the event’s significance can be 
gleaned from the remarks made on the occasion of the fair’s opening by Presi-
dent Roosevelt and future Chairman of the National Democratic Party, Edward 
Flynn, who served as the United States Commissioner General to the fair in 
both 1939 and 1940. In the more public of these two speeches, the President 
stood before the fair’s Lagoon of Nations and solemnly declared to newsreel 
cameras and the gathered crowd that his New Deal United States ‘stands today 
as a completely homogenous civilization from Coast to Coast and from North 
to South . . . united in its desire to encourage peace and good-will among all the 
nations of the Earth.’ Roosevelt went on to explain (in the rather folksy par-
lance of an American frontiersman) that ‘the eyes of the United States are fixed 
on the future. Our wagon is hitched to a star . . . a star of friendship, a star 
of progress for mankind, a star of greater happiness and less hardship a star of 
22 J. Cusker, H. Harrison, Dawn of a New 3. For more on Whalen’s dismissal as Police Commis-
sioner, see Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade 
(New York: Basic Books, 1984), 33–35.
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international good-will, and, above all, a star of peace.’23 Just five days earlier, 
at a dinner held at the Plaza Hotel in honor of the Commissioners from foreign 
governments to the fair, Flynn deployed somewhat similar metaphorical imag-
ery in describing the role of the exposition. He referred to the fair as a ‘symbol 
of the world’ and lauded its potential as a uniquely unifying force: ‘For now the 
world itself, once a collection of distant states, has become a village, populated 
by the neighborhood of nations, living within sound of one another’s voices.’ 
He also, however, took a moment to lament the reality that ‘unfortunately the 
world is not so tidy a community as the one we have built on the meadows.’24 
From the perspective of American government officials, such a ‘tidy’ commu-
nity had been engineered not for the sake of profit and mere spectacle, but in 
an increasingly desperate bid to advance an American-authored vision of 
peace through maintainance of the Wilsonian order.
The fair commission’s readiness to link spatial or structural design to the 
lasting health of a cooperative civilization was made clear by Flynn from the 
very outset of the fair. Without naming a specific pavilion, architect, style, na-
tion, or government, the hosting Commissioner General seemed to celebrate 
the unique stylistic predilections of each participating country while ostensi-
bly also offering to overlook any of the unsavory socio-political baggage those 
countries may have mapped onto their assigned exhibition space:
In the community of nations there are various discordant kinds of archi-
tecture that cannot be remodeled overnight, there are weeds in every 
backyard that cannot easily be landscaped, there are conditions that are 
far from man’s ideal for the world as he would rebuild it nearer to his 
heart’s desire. But in building the Fair we have created an ideal new world 
in microcosm, a preview of what civilization is capable of doing for itself. 
Here each nation has brought the flower of its achievement, the best it 
has to contribute. Leaving behind the weeds in our backyards, giving no 
space to the features in our national lives in which we take no pride, we, 
the representatives of sixty nations, have clustered our houses around 
23 fdr, address delivered at the opening of the New York World’s Fair, 30 April 1939. Master 
Speech File, Series 1, Box 46, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park.
24 Remarks by Edward J. Flynn, U.S. Commissioner General, upon the occasion of a dinner 
given in honor of the Commissioners from foreign governments to the New York World’s 
Fair, on 25 April 1939 at the Hotel Plaza. The Papers of Edward J. Flynn, box 24, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park.
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our village green, the Court of Peace, and around our village pond, the 
Lagoon of Nations.25
Although the somewhat hackneyed scholarly assertion that American inter-
war diplomacy was dogged by a certain naiveté has already pervaded the rath-
er limited and underwhelming historiography of the 1939 World’s Fair, such a 
remark betrays a willingness on behalf of the Fair Commission (and by exten-
sion, the United States Government) to proactively sanitize any instance of the 
type of programmatic messaging embedded within the physical expression of 
certain political movements on display in Paris two years prior.26 This was, in 
effect, a coping mechanism for a perceived eventuality, more of a cynical 
method of censorship than an authentic display of utopian idealism as exem-
plified by the League of Nations through the construction of its own modest 
pavilion at this same fair.27 Nonetheless, perhaps only an overly-Panglossian 
sense of entrepreneurial optimism, at least on the part of its financiers, 
could explain this gathering of nations which persisted in spite of increasing-
ly  ominous rhetorical-political, and eventually militaristic escalation across 
Europe.
While Whalen’s World’s Fair Corporation may have been officially labeled as 
‘a nonprofit-making’ endeavor and operated under the legal status of an educa-
tional institution, the scale, ambition, and overtly commercial tone of the New 
York World’s exposition helps distinguish it from its predecessors in Chica-
go  and Paris.28 At least three times larger in total area than Chicago’s 1933 
 Century  of Progress Exposition and almost five times larger than the 1937 
 International Exposition of Arts and Technology in Modern Life in Paris, the 
New York World’s Fair provided ample space for the interpenetration of global 
25 Remarks by Edward J. Flynn, U.S. Commissioner General, upon the occasion of a dinner 
given in honor of the Commissioners from foreign governments to the New York World’s 
Fair, on 25 April 1939 at the Hotel Plaza, OF 2446, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Li-
brary, Hyde Park.
26 P. Rotholz, Foreword,’ in H. Harrison, J. Cusker, ed. Dawn of a New Day: The New York 
World’s Fair (New York: New York University Press, 1980), vi. On the naiveté of fdr, see 
also M. Stoler, ‘A Half Century of Conflict: Interpretations of U.S. World War ii Diplomacy,’ 
Diplomatic History 18, (1994): 378–380.
27 Marco Duranti, ‘Utopia, Nostalgia and World War at the 1939–40 New York World’s Fair,’ 
Journal of Contemporary History 41, (2006): 663–683.
28 Building the World of Tomorrow: Official Guidebook of the New York World’s Fair, 1939 (New 
York: Exposition Publications, 1939), 26. The Guidebook explicitly points out the financial 
assistance of the French government in the organization of the Paris Exposition.
Downloaded from Brill.com12/19/2019 02:50:25PM
via free access
Fortuna
<UN>
192
fascism 8 (2019) 179-218
diplomatic and business interests. Indeed, despite its vocal support of the 
 project, the federal government never offered more than a meagre five million 
dollars in financial support.29 Organized around a central theme of techno-
logical innovation and discovery, the fair housed large exhibits dedicated to, 
and staffed by, its corporate sponsors. The exhibits furnished by General Mo-
tors and ibm, for example, continued the efforts of the Chicago fair which fea-
tured a giant Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company Pavilion and 
full-size test track engineered by Chrysler Motors to offer visitors the chance to 
ride in the newest vehicular models. Fair-sponsored films such as the Robert 
Snody-directed and Westinghouse-produced ‘Middleton Family at the 1939 
New York World’s Fair’, reinforced the consumer-capitalist tone of the exposi-
tion through the dramatization of a love triangle between the middle-class 
daughter of the family, her Bolshevist boyfriend (who happened to be a local 
professor of art history), and the ‘all-American’, family-favored young entrepre-
neurial heartthrob (somewhat anticlimactically destined to win her affection 
by the end of the short film). Notably, however, the commercial overtones of 
this particular fair (a giant cash register recorded the daily attendance figures) 
were not enough to  deter Soviet participation, and in fact, it was Boris Iofan 
and Karo Alabian’s ussr Pavilion, outfitted with Alexey Douchkine’s full-scale 
model of the Moscow Mayakovskaya Metro Station, which took home the fair’s 
prize for design.30
The overwhelming emphasis on the relationship between technological 
progress and the universal consumer was one of the superficial ways the fair 
intended to combat the nationalistic superciliousness exhibited at recent ex-
positions. The fair also purported to maintain relatively strict guidelines for 
international participation. For example, its embargo on the dissemination of 
political propaganda in any form was front page news,31 and after observing 
the way in which the Nazi and Soviet pavilions physically dominated the Paris 
Expo, organizers made a point of stressing to international participants in New 
York that the general height of any foreign building was not to exceed the 
height of the U.S. Government exhibit.32 Furthermore, any sculptural figure 
would only be acceptable on the exterior of buildings if it was not ‘of such 
29 Letter G. Creel to fdr, 26 April 1937. Interestingly, the fair’s official guidebook reduces this 
number to 3 million dollar. See Building the World of Tomorrow, 25–27.
30 Marianne Ström, Metro-art in the Metro-polis,’ (Paris: acr Édition, 1994), 96.
31 Unattributed, ‘Reich Withdraws from World’s Fair,’ New York Times, 27 April 1938, 1.
32 Memorandum, Admiral Standley, 24 November 1937, Memoranda folders, General Ad-
ministration and Operations, Foreign Participation Department Subseries, Government 
Participation, nywf-nypl.
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character, size, or height as to compete with the fair’s central statue of George 
Washington.’33 Such regulations were duly enforced, and Italy, though having 
reluctantly agreed to relegate its statue of Mussolini to the interior of its pavil-
ion, was indeed reprimanded for having erected a gilded statue of the goddess 
Italia (tellingly, ‘Italia’ is sometimes also referred to as ‘Roma’ throughout Ital-
ian-authored documents related to the fair) erected along the main façade of 
its free covered space.34 More severe, still, might have been the commission’s 
use of foreign lots to effectively form a border zone around the fairgrounds, a 
decision which set the 1939 World’s Fair even further apart from its predeces-
sors, and was presented as a direct attempt to avoid the political posturing on 
display at Paris.35 (Figure 3 and 4)
Also contrasting the last exposition was the attention paid by fair organizers 
to questions of architectural homogeneity. Whereas in Paris stylistic plurality 
had come as a consequence of the decision to include certain national pavil-
ions on the fair’s main thoroughfare, architectural historian and critic Lewis 
Mumford steered the so-called ‘Fair of the Future Committee’ in a more inven-
tive, modernist direction and explicitly away from any possibility of his team 
designing a 1939 fair which might embody a pastiche of neoclassicism or the 
inclusion of any structure that might resemble a ‘Parthenon on a Flushing 
Swamp.’36 While the much smaller 1929 exposition in Barcelona had birthed 
what became known as the ‘Art Deco’ style, one critic decreed that this World’s 
Fair had produced what might rightly be called the ‘Corporation Style’ of archi-
tecture.37 Even if we are to overlook such opprobrium and attribute some de-
gree of success to the planners and architects that sought to compose the fair 
of more homologous forms evocative of the new futuristic and experimental 
designs of the International or academic Beaux-Arts styles, Italy’s architectural 
contribution to this fair was decidedly unique in its decision to craftily marry 
the fair’s calls for sleek modern design with its own slowly-hardening affinity 
for imperial classicism.38
33 Ibid.
34 Letter Cantù to Whalen, 24 April 1939. Italy folders, Countries files, Foreign Participation 
Department subseries, Government Department series, nywf-nypl.
35 Eugene Santomasso, ‘The Design of Reason: Architecture and Planning at the 1939–40 
New York World’s Fair,’ in H. Harrison, ed., Dawn of a New Day: The New York World’s Fair, 
1939–40 (New York: New York University Press, 1980), 32.
36 Santomasso, ‘The Design of Reason,’ 30. See also Unattributed, ‘World Fair Friends Rally 
to Keep “Parthenon off Flushing Swamp”,’ New York Herald Tribune, December 12, 1935, 26.
37 Frederick Gutheim, ‘Buildings at the Fair,’ Magazine of Art 32 (May 1939): 286–89, 316–317. 
Quoted in Santomasso, ‘The Design of Reason,’ 39.
38 Santomasso, ‘The Design of Reason,’ 39.
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Figure 3 German Pavilion at the 1937 Paris International Exposition. Speer’s 
54-meter tower was capped by a 9-meter tall eagle and punctuated 
by a pair of bronze statues designed by Josef Thorak. Image in the 
public domain.
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Figure 4 General plan of the 1939 New York World’s Fair. Julian E. Garnsey’s spatially-
oriented color scheme organized the fair into themed zones. The tone assigned 
to each zone was realized in the flora and flags which accented each spoke of the 
fair’s axial design. As one moved deeper into the fair and closer to the foreign 
exhibit zone the tones grew markedly more intense.
Source: Official Guidebook of the New York World’s Fair (New York: 
Exposition Publications, Inc., 1939), 7. Collection of R. Gallo.
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4 Italian Participation
In its decision to build Busiri Vici’s classical pavilion, Italy placed its modern, 
nationalistic vision of resurrected antiquity on proud display. The spoils of re-
cent archaeological excavations, including reconstructions by Professor Luigi 
de Gregori and Italo Gismondi, were presented as part of the larger effort to 
fuse a connection between what Fascist leadership referred to as the ‘First’ 
Rome of the Caesars and ‘Third’ Rome of Fascism.39 Such reconstructions were 
presented alongside other presentations of the classically-inflected architec-
tural program which continued to redefine the capital city in an increasingly 
pronounced classical mode.40 The scaled model of Angelo Mazzoni’s new 
Roma Termini, for example, ‘the largest and most attractive railroad terminal 
in Europe . . . a great artistic building decorated with many of the most beauti-
ful Italian marbles and architectural structures worthy of ancient and imperial 
Rome,’ was placed steps away from exhibits relating to the ancient Roman em-
perors and writers in the pavilion’s ‘Hall of Rome Down the Ages,’ an exhibition 
organized exclusively by the Institute of Roman Studies.41 Admiral Giuseppe 
Cantu, Commissioner General for Italy’s Participation in the fair, described 
Busiri Vici’s pavilion as ‘an ingenious synthesis of the architecture of classical 
Rome and modern dynamic Italy.’42 Later written versions of this statement 
printed in the fair’s guidebook were even altered to further classicize the ex-
hibit. Changes as substantial as the addition of entire phrases such as ‘The 
growth of Rome from the time of the Caesars to the present’, represent the Italy 
of Mussolini not just as the logical heir to the glory and imperium of the past, 
but also as something of a living, breathing socio-cultural organism whose 
lifespan had been regrettably interrupted by the disorganization and fractured 
state of the pre-unification, pre-Fascist Italian Peninsula.43 Other, nearly unde-
tectable changes, such as the addition of the word ‘ancient’ to the description 
of the rare book exhibit, betray the tireless commitment of Party-dominated 
design teams to render this structure a complimentary embodiment of the 
39 Unattributed, Italy at the World’s Fair, 1939 (Rome: Vallecchi, 1939). Busta 1099, Fasc. 10708, 
S. Fasc. 49, eur Archives, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.
40 For more on the regime’s classicizing tendencies and the built environment of Rome, see 
especially Joshua Arthurs, Excavating Modernity: The Roman Past in Fascist Italy (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2012); Emilio Gentile, Fascismo di Pietra (Bari: Laterza, 2007); 
and Kallis, The Third Rome.
41 Unattributed, Italy at the World’s Fair, 1939. Busta 1099, Fasc. 10708, S. Fasc. 49, eur 
Archives, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
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Mussolinian interpretation of romanità.44 As the work of Lisa Schrenck has 
made clear, such a fusion of the historicized past and celebration of the 
 Fascist-engineered successes of the present had already proven palatable to 
international audiences at prior fairs, and through commissioning a new archi-
tect to design the 1939 pavilion, the regime committed itself to a very public 
renegotiation of its treatment of the classical and modern mode.45
5 The Italian Pavilion
According to the official exhibit plans for the Italian Pavilion issued to the fair’s 
Department of Feature Publicity (curiously submitted in Italian), the three-
storied structure, which occupied ‘100,000 square feet of space’ on plot GJ-1 at 
Presidential Row North and Continental Avenue, represented an expenditure 
of more than three million U.S. dollars.46 Such a financial commitment ranks 
Italy second, behind the Soviet Union, and ahead of France and French Mo-
rocco, Great Britain, and Poland in terms of total dollars spent before the fair’s 
opening.47 The plans explain that the tower, set to surmount the Italian Pavil-
ion, would support a thirty-three foot ‘replica of the ancient statue of the God-
dess Roma, the original of which stood on the Capitoline Hill in Rome.’48 The 
treatment of columns and arches, meanwhile, would ‘recall the classical archi-
tecture of Imperial Rome’s temples and aqueducts.’49 An official news release 
described the style of architecture as ‘modern-classical’ while its later descrip-
tions of the shimmering waterfall dedicated to Marconi’s world-changing in-
vention of the modern radio offered a more colorful depiction of the structure 
intended to represent ‘the resurrection of Imperial Rome, the fountainhead of 
civilization, made greater than ever by Fascism.’50 This pool was flanked by 
44 Busta 1099, Fasc. 10708, S. Fasc. 49, eur Archives, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.
45 Lisa Schrenck, Building a Century of Progress: The Architecture of Chicago’s 1933–34 World’s 
Fair (Duluth: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 93.
46 Engineering records list this space has actually having only 99,579 square feet. Italy fold-
ers, Engineering Records, Construction Department subseries, Operating Division, 
nywf-nypl.
47 Ranked billing statement, 10 November 1939. Italy folders, Countries files, Foreign Partici-
pation subseries, Government Participation, nywf-nypl.
48 Busta 1099, Fasc. 10708, S. Fasc. 49, eur Archives, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.
49 Ibid.
50 News Release, no. 328 (undated). Italy folders, Countries files, Foreign Participation sub-
series, Government Participation, nywf-nypl. See also Busta 1099, Fasc. 10708, S. Fasc. 
49, eur Archives, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.
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lofty colonnades which linked the structure’s entrance and exit while rising 
high above the frontal peristyle and oblong-shaped block of the building itself. 
(Figures 1, 5, 6) Though the pool was graced by the bust of Marconi, the recur-
ring aquatic theme here served to further reinforce the regime’s ‘mare nostrum’ 
message of Mediterranean reclamation. In typical Roman fashion, the base of 
the edifice was composed of light-yellow Italian travertine. Above the base 
rose rusticated walls of stucco.
Another ten thousand feet were contracted for Italian use in the fair’s Hall 
of Nations. There, the mosaic floor was to be graced by a high pillar upon which 
rested the ubiquitous She-Wolf, mother of Romulus, the legendary founder of 
Rome. Above Nino Giordano’s Capitoline She-Wolf extended the lines of a Ro-
man triumphal arch.51 The long side walls, adorned with ‘the emblems of an-
cient and modern Rome’ as well as maps of ‘Her new colonial empire’ were 
divided into three sections by columns with rostra rising on a plinth of black 
marble and accentuated by ‘Roman stucco of a velvety-white color.’52 These 
walls sheltered Romano Romanelli’s bronze statue of the Duce, which stood 
tall upon a black marble pedestal in the very center of the room.53 Although 
neither the mosaics nor maps survive, they are reminiscent of similar orna-
mentation which had recently graced certain areas of the Eternal city. These 
maps appear very similar to those mounted along the newly constructed Via 
dell’Impero from 1934 to 1936 to illustrate the empire’s gradual accumulation of 
territory from the Flavian Dynasty of 69 A.D. to the period of Fascist rule.54
Although the regime had long proven skillful at broadcasting its ability to 
subordinate nature and its bounty to Roman imperial will in the name of mon-
umental construction,55 the 1939 Italian Pavilion was pieced together by a 
 mélange of materials. Whereas the more visible, exterior elements were in-
deed imported from Italy, the majority of the structure was made of American 
51 Busta 1099, Fasc. 10708, S. Fasc. 49, eur Archives, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.
52 News Release, no. 328 (undated). Italy folders, Countries files, Foreign Participation sub-
series, Government Participation, nywf-nypl.
53 Unattributed, Italy at the World’s Fair, 1939. Busta 1099, Fasc. 10708, S. Fasc. 49, eur Ar-
chives, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.
54 See B. Painter Jr., Mussolini’s Rome: Rebuilding the Eternal City (New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2007), 24.
55 Though it never did appear in full-force, Cinecittà Luce had lobbied for permission to 
document the glories of the Italian Pavilion so that it could be ‘shown in the different 
movie houses.’ See the letter from Cantu to Collins, director of the fair’s News Reels 
 Division, 7 June 1939. Busta 1099, Fasc. 10708, S. Fasc. 49, eur Archives, Archivio Centrale 
dello Stato, Rome.
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Figure 5 Design Drawing, Italian Pavilion New York World’s Fair 1939: The Entrance Hall, 1938, 
Michelle Busiri Vici, architect.
Source: The Wolfsonian – Florida International University, Miami 
Beach, Florida, The Mitchell Wolfson, Jr. Collection. Photo: 
Silvia Ros.
materials and assembled by American labor.56 While most of the wood used 
for the pavilion came from Idaho, the frame of this structure was composed of 
steel purchased from the Bethlehem Steel Company of nearby Pennsylvania.57 
Aside from its steel frame, the inclusion of an aquatic monument to Marconi 
represented the extent to which this structure sought to imbue any novel sense 
of aesthetic modernism. Instead, this structure largely fell in line with what 
can arguably be described as an increasingly uniform style of Fascist- sponsored 
56 Letter Cantu to Voorhees, 29 September 1937. Busta 1099, Fasc. 10708, S. Fasc. 49, eur 
Archives, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.
57 Busta 1099, Fasc. 10708, S. Fasc. 49, eur Archives, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.
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architecture which, in spite of the commission of different draftsmen, was 
 already beginning to work towards the development of the E.U.R., which would 
offer the regime something of a tabula rasa upon which it intended to inscribe 
its most coherent argument in defense of reactionary modernism to date. To 
do so, it would deploy carefully aligned constellations of architectural forms 
and the aesthetic convictions they embodied. The attendance of a global audi-
ence, meanwhile, would amplify the Fascist message embedded within every 
meter of the E.U.R. quarter.
The carefully-detailed plans for this exhibition, dating as far back as 1936, 
betray a skillful deployment of Fascist iconography and ideological praise, 
while still bending toward conformity in order to contribute whole-heartedly 
to the commercial thrust behind the fair at large. In this way, the regime saw 
itself as able to court both the public opinion with which it was unceasingly 
concerned, as well as valuable business interests. The regime’s preoccupation 
with the former, at least in this very specific context of the 1939 World’s Fair, 
can be traced back to certain documents preserved in the archives of both 
the World’s Fair Corporation and the regime’s own Propaganda Ministry. The 
World’s Fair Corporation spent considerable energy working to avoid some of 
the more obvious mistakes made by Whalen’s team in its own preparation 
of  the E42.58 Meanwhile, the regime’s ostensibly genuine belief that 
58 Italian translation of Emile Benoist’s 15 July 1939 article in the Montreal-based Le Devoir, 
Busta 1100, Fasc. 10708, S. Fasc. 61, eur Archives, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome. The 
translator working for the propaganda office highlights the journalist’s criticism of the 
Figure 6 Design Drawing, Italian Pavilion New York World’s Fair 1939: View of the Backside, 
Principal View, Cross Section, 1938, Michele Busiri Vici, architect.
Source: The Wolfsonian – Florida International University, Miami 
Beach, Florida, The Mitchell Wolfson, Jr. Collection. Photo: 
Lynton Gardiner.
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 participation at the 1939 fair would yield certain desperately-needed financial 
advantages is evidenced in the advertisements of private companies which 
adorn several  editions of fair guidebooks. Selected private vendors housed 
within the pavilion offered everything from custom leather goods and designer 
fashion to spaghetti and imported mineral water.59 Advertisements, such as 
the one for Milan-based Società Italiana Ernesto Breda, whose images add a 
burst of color to the otherwise grayscale 1939 Vallecchi-edited guidebook, pro-
moted Italian-made ‘military tractors, aircraft, machine guns, rifles, hand gre-
nades and bombs, and shells’, while an advertisement for the Turin-based fiat, 
which had benefitted tremendously from the regime’s recent conquest of Af-
rica, also peddled ‘special motor vehicles for civil and military purposes.’ (Fig-
ure 7) These advertisements can actually be interpreted as statements, in their 
own right, of Italian military capabilities, and were thereby as rhetorical as 
they were commercial. By exhibiting at the New York World’s Fair, Fascist Italy 
was able to again remind the world of its military potency and project an im-
age of economic stability, when in reality, Mussolini had complained that same 
summer of having been ‘bled white’ by the Spanish Civil War.60
6 German Withdrawal
The Reich’s late reversal of its decision to participate in the 1939 World’s Fair, in 
spite of the fervent attempts on behalf of American organizers to finally con-
firm such participation (even at the expense of several other would-be partici-
pants), suggests that National Socialist Germany came to believe the contro-
versy surrounding the very idea of its involvement in the event would limit its 
ability to make use of the same propagandistic or diplomatic opportunities 
enjoyed by Fascist Italy. Evidently, the significance (political, commercial, or 
otherwise) of these expositions to foreign exhibitors, then, even to the two 
most identifiably ‘fascist’ regimes, was not universal. This renders explora-
tion of the German non-appearance at the final world’s fair to be held before 
the onset of the Second World War as important to our understanding of the 
period as study of the Italian material contribution. The Reich’s decision to 
meandering streets in which ‘it is easy to get lost and the visitor abandons himself to 
chance.’
59 Contractual amendment, 19 June 1940. Italy folders, Foreign files, Participation subseries, 
Central Files, nywf-nypl.
60 Angel Viñas, ‘The Financing of the Spanish Civil War,’ in Revolution and War in Spain, 
1931–39, ed. Paul Preston (London: Routledge, 1984), 273–277.
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Figure 7 Advertisement for Società Italiana Ernesto Breda. 
Source: Italy at the World’s Fair: New York 1939 (Rome: Vallecchi, 
1939), 3.
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reverse course with regard to the New York event was preceded by a loud wave 
of both popular and political criticism within the host country itself. Questions 
as to why such objections were not raised over Italian presence, and how ex-
actly fair organizers remained committed to doing all they could to ensure Ger-
man presence in spite of these protests, can only begin to be answered through 
close examination of the surviving records of the World’s Fair Corporation in 
New York and the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin.
Even without any surviving architectural design plan or detailed record of 
what the Ministry of Propaganda and its Reich Chamber of Culture might have 
intended for the World’s Fair of 1939, in Germany’s highly conspicuous ab-
sence, we can learn a great deal. For one, the Nazi policy of autarky was sym-
bolically defended in such an absence. Throughout the fair’s rather protracted 
planning phase, the Reich spent a considerable amount of energy attempting 
to confirm its right to use imported German material and manpower through-
out the event as late as spring 1938.61 Numerous Nazi officials and German dig-
nitaries, including Fritz Wiedemann,62 personal adjutant to Hitler, Princess 
Stephanie von Hohenlohe,63 and a group of twenty-eight German mechanical 
engineers64 were dispatched across the Atlantic to inspect the grounds and 
reassure Berlin that the space was indeed worthy of a National Socialist struc-
ture (and the foreign exchange it would require).65 There was even some dis-
cussion of Hitler venturing to the world’s fair himself, as Wiedemann explained 
to Whalen’s representatives that the Führer ‘was very anxious to see New York, 
as he is an architect and tremendously interested in what (the world’s fair 
 corporation) was doing.’66 In this way, before publicly admitting so through 
 benevolent reference to the fair as a ‘magnificent spectacle which millions of 
61 Letter Killeen to Standley, 31 March 1938. Germany folders, Countries files, Foreign Partici-
pation subseries, Government Participation, nywf-nypl. See also, Letter Auswärtiges 
Amt to Wiedemann, 38 December 1937. Records of the Federal Foreign Office, R/901/114751, 
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde.
62 Letter Hartigan to Standley, 23 December 1937. Germany folders, Countries files, Foreign 
Participation subseries, Government Participation, nywf-nypl. Wiedemann’s personal 
papers are held in the Institut für Zeitgeschichte Munich.
63 Letter Hartigan to Standley, 5 November 1937. Germany folders, Countries files, Foreign 
Participation subseries, Government Participation, nywf-nypl.
64 News Release, 31 January 1939. Germany folders, Foreign files, Participation subseries, Cen-
tral Files, nywf-nypl.
65 Letter Auswärtiges Amt (unsigned) to Wiedemann, 38 December 1937. Records of the 
Federal Foreign Office, R/901/114751, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde.
66 Letter Hartigan to Standley, 2 December 1937. Ibid.
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visitors would be unable to forget’,67 Germany had quietly acknowledged the 
event’s geopolitical significance, and the absence of official German represen-
tation can thus be interpreted as either a very public acknowledgement of its 
inability to overcome financial constraints, or a calculated defensive decision 
made in response to threats of a boycott and protest by some particularly pow-
erful American voices, including the mayor of New York City himself, Fiorello 
La Guardia.
While Mussolini had previously expressed his determination to use the Fas-
cist pavilions built abroad for previous world’s fairs in order to win the political 
support of local Italian-American communities, the National Socialist pres-
ence across the United States had never achieved a formidable foothold and 
there is little reason to believe that the appearance of a German delegation at 
the 1939 World’s Fair would have prompted any meaningful surge amongst 
German-American Nazis or Nazi sympathizers.68 Brendan Simms has recently 
noted that while an Orstgruppe had been founded in Chicago as early as 1924 
and there ‘appears to have been some sort of [American Nazi] presence in New 
York City’, National Socialist attempts to establish any viable foothold within 
the interwar United States largely failed.69 Likewise, the more organic threat of 
the German American Bund which caused some distress throughout the late 
1930s appears, in retrospect, to have been ‘exaggerated.’70 In the words of Le-
land Bell, the Bund ‘neither warranted the attention it received nor ever pre-
sented a threat to American institutions.’71
Although, to an extent, the common explanation for German withdraw-
al   related to financial concern is indeed plausible given the Reich’s 
well- documented concern over exchange, it is worth considering some addi-
tional layers of financial concern which extend beyond questions of foreign 
exchange credits. Given the increasingly severe taxes levied against German 
67 News Release, 31 January 1939. Germany folders, Foreign files, Participation subseries, Cen-
tral Files, nywf-nypl.
68 For a discussion of the ‘wild enthusiasm’ generated by the roundtrip, multi-stop tour of 
Fascist Quadrumvir Italo Balbo and his ‘flying armada’ of twenty-four Savoia-Marchetti 
SM.55X seaplanes from Rome to the Chicago World’s Fair, and the positive effect it may 
have had not only on Italians back in Europe, but also the millions of Italian-Americans 
whose political support Mussolini was determined to win, see Schrenck, Building a Cen-
tury of Progress, 93. See also, John Patrick Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism: The View From 
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).
69 Simms, Hitler, 80.
70 Leland Bell, ‘The Failure of Nazism in America: The German American Bund, 1936–1941,’ 
Political Science Quarterly 85 (1970): 585.
71 Ibid.
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imports, the commerciality of the fair would have placed German participa-
tion on an uneven footing. Furthermore, as Göring’s Four Year Plan increas-
ingly focused financial resources and drew Germany closer to full-scale mili-
tary mobilization and war, Reich administration saw little point in committing 
to an overseas exposition which might temporally conflict with explosive mili-
tary action. Surely, the latter idea was not considered by the Polish govern-
ment, whose  sizable financial commitment to its own exhibition area at the 
fair was only rewarded with some twelve weeks of earnest participation. Fol-
lowing the Nazi invasion that September, Warsaw’s economic support of the 
exhibition waned and then halted as the Polish pavilion, after being draped in 
black cloth, came to rely on public donations and local fundraising efforts to 
remain open throughout the rest of the exhibition period.72 Confoundingly, 
meanwhile, the invasion of Poland and general escalation of tensions prompt-
ed one frequent fairgoer to write the Chairman of the Board of the World’s Fair 
Corporation to ensure the Italian Pavilion, ‘one of the most beautiful building 
(sic) in the Worlds’ (sic) Fair, with its magnificent architecture and lovely dis-
play which had been visited and admired by 9,271,165 persons from May 15th to 
October 30th’, would not be demolished as was evidently rumored.73
In any case, records indicate that the World’s Fair Corporation was resolved 
to lobby for German participation in spite of considerable protest and severe 
criticism from a variety of sources across the United States. In a letter dated 15 
December 1936, Fred Dannick, Secretary at the American League Against War 
and Fascism wrote Grover Whalen asking for more information regarding the 
invitation known to have been extended to Nazi Germany. A response would 
come one week later, not by Whalen himself, but by an administrative assistant 
who curtly (and dishonestly) reminded Dannick that ‘as far as we know no 
country has yet accepted the President’s invitation to participate . . . The Presi-
dent sent invitations to all countries with whom we have diplomatic relations.’74 
The World’s Fair Corporation again deflected responsibility in its similarly 
terse response to the letters of protest authored by Morris Mallinger, Chairman 
of the Anti-Nazi Federation of Pittsburgh, and Samuel Untermayer, President 
72 For a provocative discussion of the contents of the Polish Pavilion at the 1939 New York 
World’s Fair and its role in advancing a state-authored narrative of national homogeneity, 
see E. Zimnica, ‘Making History: Poland at the 1939 World’s Fair in New York,’ unpublished 
M.A. thesis, Queen’s University, 1999.
73 Letter H. W. Gibson to M. Hughes, 6 November 1939. Italy folders, Countries files, General 
Administration and Operations subseries, Foreign Participation Department, Govern-
ment Participation, nywf-nypl.
74 Letter F. Dannick to H.A. Flanigan, 15 Dec 1936. Germany papers, Foreign files, Participa-
tion subseries, Central Files, nywf-nypl.
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of the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League: ‘Invitations to foreign nations to par-
ticipate in New York World’s Fair were issued by the President through the 
State Department under an act of Congress requesting the President of the 
United States to invite nations having diplomatic relations with this country to 
participate in the fair. Matter of invitations to foreign nations being entirely in 
hands of federal government are therefore beyond our control.’75 Almost iden-
tical responses were addressed to leaders of the joint boycott arranged by the 
American Jewish Labor Committee and American Jewish Congress,76 while 
the objections raised by academics at schools such as the University of 
Michigan,77 New York University,78 and Oberlin College79 also went ignored.
After Germany’s strong showing in Paris 1937, it was apparently thought to 
have been good business to ensure a German delegation was on hand two 
years later in New York. Undeterred by the drama prompted by Nazi participa-
tion in the 1933 fair, Whalen was ready and eager to cash in on the free publicity 
generated by any further excitement as long as the State Department main-
tained its open stance toward German inclusion.80 In fact, such excitement 
came rather early on, when Mayor La Guardia launched a verbal attack on the 
very idea of German participation, introducing his infamous ‘House of Hor-
rors’ proposal for the German Pavilion at a luncheon of the Women’s Division 
of the American Jewish Congress at the Hotel Astor in Manhattan on 3 March 
1937. Besides prompting Becker of the German Consulate General to cancel 
dinner plans with Whalen in New York, dispatches from Berlin indicate that La 
Guardia’s derision actually bothered the Führer personally, and was likely to 
have been an early, yet insurmountable obstacle on the path to German par-
ticipation.81 La Guardia also served on the provisional organizing committee 
of the so-called ‘Freedom Pavilion’ planned for the world’s fair without the 
 approval of Whalen’s corporation. In the end, fair officials prevented the pavil-
ion from ever opening, but according to its own description ‘the purpose of the 
proposed pavilion . . . (would have been) to show Americans everything that 
fell to ashes in Germany as the Nazis rose to power’ and to serve as ‘a vivid 
75 Letter, Flanigan to Ostroff, 16 February 1937. Ibid.
76 Letter from the Joint Boycott Council of the American Jewish Congress and Jewish Labor 
Committee to Grover Whalen, 22 October 1936. Germany folders, Foreign files, Participa-
tion subseries, Central Files, nywf-nypl.
77 Letter from Prof. M. Levi to Whalen, 9 December 1936. Ibid.
78 Letter from Robert Cohn to Gerhardt Seeger, 15 June 1938. Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 For more on the uproar caused by a swastika-clad German zeppelin and Goebbels’ can-
celled visit to Chicago in 1934, see Ganz, The 1933 Chicago World’s Fair: 144.
81 Letter from E.F. Roosevelt, director of Foreign Exhibits Division to W.H. Standley, 4 March 
1937. Germany folders, Foreign files, Participation subseries, Central Files, nywf-nypl.
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 reminder that Germany before Hitler was a land where thought and religion 
were free; that most Americans of German ancestry, and millions of Germans 
in Germany today, sorrow for that lost freedom.’82 (Figure 8) Archival records 
also demonstrate that high profile members of the local Jewish community 
82 L. Hobson, ‘Der verhinderte Freiheits-Pavillon: Monsignor Lavelle droht mit Krieg: Die 
rolle des Herrn Victor Ridder: Mr. Whalen ueberlegt es sich,’ Deutsches Volksecho, 6 May 
1939, 3.
Figure 8 Cover of informational brochure for the anti-Nazi Freedom Pavilion
source: Deutsches Volksecho, 6 May 1939, 3.
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took to politically threatening. La Guardia as he tried to reconcile his fervor for 
hosting the fair with his disdain for Nazi politics. One local rabbi went so far in 
January 1937 as to threateningly remind the mayor that it would seem
highly inconsistent of you as a leader in the anti-Nazi boycott and in view 
of your splendid record in humanitarian endeavors to allow in this city . . . 
an exhibit of Nazi merchandise in connection therewith under the de-
testable swastika which can only arouse widespread unrest and sharp 
disapproval among a considerable section of the population of this city 
with possible serious consequences to public peace and to the success of 
the World’s Fair itself.83
In addition to apologies issued by U.S. Secretary of State Hull,84 there were, to 
be sure, counter-protests launched by the likes of the Board of Trade for Ger-
man American Commerce,85 Steuben Society of America,86 and the New York-
based Citizens Protective League,87 but the overwhelming majority of relevant 
material on file within the archives of the World’s Fair Corporation indicate 
that fair organizers were prepared to endure staunch opposition to any Ger-
man involvement.
Evidently, only to United States Congressmen did Whalen respond directly, 
opting more often to delegate the duty to a secretary or other representative. In 
a letter of 13 November 1937, Representative Emmanuel Celler of Pennsylvania 
described Germany as ‘alone, the cursed parish among the nations of the 
world’, and urged Whalen to remember that ‘those who are entrusted with the 
privilege and responsibility of guiding the destinies of the Fair, take not one 
step, by word or deed, to give even the slightest encouragement to that barbaric 
reversion which has come to be known as Hitlerism.’88 If, he continued, the 
objective of the fair was ‘the improvement of international relations by por-
traying interrelationship and interdependence of all groups and peoples’, then 
‘to permit Germany to exhibit . . . is, in a sense, making excuse for the horrific 
83 Letter, Rabbi Gross of the Jewish Examiner to La Guardia, 8 January 1937. Germany fold-
ers, Foreign files, Participation subseries, Central Files, nywf-nypl.
84 ‘Reich Withdraws from World’s Fair,’ New York Times, 27 April 1938, 1.
85 Telegram from Board of Trade for German American Commerce to Whalen, 4 March 1937 
Germany folders, Foreign files, Participation subseries, Central Files, nywf-nypl.
86 Letter to Whalen from Steuben Society of America, 20 January 1937. Ibid.
87 New York City municipal election pamphlet printed by the Citizens Protective League, 15 
December 1936. Ibid.
88 Letter Celler to Whalen, 13 November 1937, Germany folders, Foreign files, Participation 
subseries, Central Files, nywf-nypl.
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damage that Nazism has done, in the short span of five years, not only to the 
German people, but to the entire world.’89 Predictably, Whalen responded by 
reminding the congressman that the invitation was extended by ‘the Federal 
authorities pursuant to an Act of Congress and remains beyond the control of 
the Fair Corporation.’ Shortly after, the New York Times reported that Johannes 
Brochers, Consul General for Germany, had signed a contract at Whalen’s office 
in the Empire State Building guaranteeing German participation in the ‘most 
truly international exposition ever held.’90 (Figure  9) In official comment, 
89 Ibid.
90 ‘World Fair Space Taken by Germany,’ New York Times, 31 December 1937, 17; ‘Sixty Nations 
Accept World’s Fair Bids,’ New York Times, 20 December 1937, 2.
Figure 9 Dr. Hans Borchers, (left) German Consul General in New York and Grover 
Whalen, President of the World’s Fair Corporation signs contract for German 
participation in the New York World’s Fair during ceremonies held in Fair 
Corporation offices in the Empire State Building.
Source: German-American Commerce Bulletin, January 1938, 6.
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 Brochers expressed his belief that the occasion ‘augurs well for a cordial rela-
tionship in the years to come between this great country and my own.’91
Efforts to distance the fair administration from the invitations were as su-
perficial as they were cynical. Correspondence between Whalen and his fair’s 
own ambassador to Europe, John Hartigan, evidence what can only be de-
scribed as an active and rather persistent period of courtship between Nazi 
Germany and Whalen’s World’s Fair Corporation. While tirelessly working to 
find ‘a solution to our German difficulties’, Hartigan kept Whalen informed 
through almost daily updates across the continent.92 After a series of discus-
sions in both New York and Berlin with Fritz Mahlo,93 to whom Hartigan re-
ferred only as ‘one of the important persons in Dr. Goebbels’ Ministry of Propa-
ganda’, more persistent (and last-minute) efforts were made to secure German 
participation.94 The nature of German expectations for participation in the 
fair can be discerned through examination of a dispatch sent following a tense 
and occasionally ‘brutal’95 winter meeting at the Reich’s Ministry of Econom-
ics on Behrenstrasse in Berlin. Hartigan finally appears to understand the 
Reich’s key points of negotiation when he reports that:
They at once began trying to trade on our helping them in Washington 
with the government on the trade situation . . . the attitude of the govern-
ment was not to participate if they could not do business with us . . . they 
brought up the fact that they did not have the money with which to pay 
for their exhibit expenses in America but that they could try and find a 
way, if possible, to work something out if we would help them. They are 
spending about Fr. 66,000,000 at Paris . . . . They were surprised that Italy 
had consented to go in and wondered where they were going to find 
the money. I had been advised from the embassy to let them know that 
91 ‘World Fair Space Taken by Germany,’ 17.
92 Letter from Hartigan to Nolan, 4 February 1937. Italian folders, Countries files, Foreign 
Participation Department subseries, Government Participation, nywf-nypl.
93 According to C.I.A. records, Mahlo was the Head of the Tourist Department in the Propa-
ganda Ministry [Ministerialdirigent, Leiter der Fremdenverkehrsabteilung im Reichspropa-
gandaministerium], born in 1895, war service 1914–1918, journalist, business executive, 
civil servant. For more on the role of Mahlo within Goebbels’ ministry, see K. Semmens, 
Seeing Hitler’s Germany: Tourism in the Third Reich (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 
139–149.
94 Letter Standley to Downes, 5 May 1938. Italian folders, Countries files, Foreign Participa-
tion Department subseries, Government Participation, nywf-nypl.
95 12 January 1937 report from Hartigan on meetings held at Reichswirtschaftsministerium, 
Behrenstrasse 43. Germany folders, Countries files, Foreign Participation Department 
subseries, Government Participation, nywf-nypl.
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they were the only one of the Big Four in Europe who had not agreed to 
go in.96
More than merely exposing actual concern over finances, such a report sug-
gests that Reich officials had been conditioned by the special treatment they 
had received during the recent planning and development of the Paris Expo.97 
In short, the Reich was looking to leverage the Americans’ obviously sincere 
hope that it would participate with a favorable adjustment in more lasting 
trade standards. Although Hartigan alleged that the Foreign Office, Propagan-
da Ministry, and Göring personally98 had already authorized participation, the 
Nazi strategy was to hold out for financial aid so as to ensure that they would 
perform ‘as well as they had in Paris.’99 Hitler’s personal vacations, military ma-
neuvers, Party congress days in Nuremberg, and visits by Mussolini, were all 
cited as reasons for the Germans’ delay in offering a definitive response.100 
When they finally asked directly for ‘help with dollars’, Hartigan refused to ac-
quiesce and rather flippantly responded that such a problem was theirs 
alone.101 He did, however, report back that the situation was ‘looking favorable’ 
and requested that fair officials keep space available for Germany until they 
receive a definite response.102
Whalen’s staff worked diligently with Hans Thomsen, Counsellor at the 
German Embassy, to find creative ways to stifle further criticism of German 
involvement, knowing full well that public reception could be as large a con-
sideration as finances for the Nazis.103 Spurred on by the inflammatory com-
ments of La Guardia, Hitler was alleged to have raised his concern over the lack 
of ‘federal-level guarantees’ of protection (economic and otherwise) at the fair, 
because he had ‘absolute proof’ that communists were planning to disrupt the 
event, as they had attempted at Paris before French security forces kept them 
at bay in 1937.104 In any case, it is clear that the German side appreciated just 
how strongly Whalen’s team desired their country’s participation and 
96 Ibid.
97 See Gordon Dutter, ‘Doing Business with the Nazis: French Economic Relations with Ger-
many under the Popular Front,’ Journal of Modern History 63 (1991): 296–326, cited in Fiss, 
Grand Illusion, 46.
98 Letter Hartigan to Standley, 7 April 1938. Germany folders, Countries files, Foreign Partici-
pation Department subseries, Government Participation, nywf-nypl.
99 Letter Hartigan to Standley, 22 September 1937. Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Letter Hartigan to Nolan, 4 February 1937. Ibid.
104 Letter Bonney to Whalen, 3 September 1937. Ibid.
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 consequently held the upper hand throughout negotiations. The considerable 
advantages offered to Nazi officials by Hartigan in his capacity as representa-
tive of both the World’s Fair Corporation and United States Government were 
still considered unsatisfactory, especially after having so recently dealt with 
the unctuous Gréber in Paris.105 Over the next several months, a furious bar-
rage of probing correspondence was dispatched from New York to Berlin in a 
last-ditch effort to salvage German interest. By 10 May 1938, however, some 
three weeks past the internal deadline Hitler had set for a final decision, a tele-
gram addressed to Secretary of State Hull from the American Embassy in Ber-
lin unceremoniously related that ‘the German Government regrets not to be 
able to participate in the World’s Fair in New York as originally planned.’106
Until 1938, the fair organizers and certain political forces had been confi-
dent that final approval would be granted and construction on the reserved lot 
would begin. Even before the telegram dispatched on 10 January 1938 from Ber-
lin to the offices of the U.S. State Department in Washington reported that ‘the 
Foreign Office is able to orally confirm the decision of the German Govern-
ment to participate . . . and will record acceptance of the invitation in a formal 
note to the embassy’,107 Germany had been afforded several special privileges. 
After being assigned the largest lot of any foreign exhibitor108 (roughly twenty-
five percent larger than that of Italy), Reich officials refused to share a border 
with Yugoslavia and demanded that the south Slavic nation’s exhibition be re-
located so as not to detract from the grandeur of the (yet undesigned) Ger-
man  pavilion.109 For no apparent reason, German would-be organizers also 
arranged for ‘Germany Day’ to be changed from the fair-assigned early sum-
mer  date of 4 June to 2 February.110 Such demands were made mere weeks 
 before the regime’s sudden decision to renege on its previous commitment of 
participation.
As leader of the National Socialist architectural program, Albert Speer’s role 
was to aestheticize political ideology and will, but also to affirm the Reich’s 
105 As explained above, scholarly consensus maintains that Gréber is likely to have furnished 
the German delegation with Boris Iofan’s plans for the Soviet Pavilion before construction 
on the German structure was completed.
106 Letter from Frentiss Gilbert, Counsellor of Embassy, to U.S. Sec of State Cordell Hull, 10 
May 1938. Germany folders, Countries files, Foreign Partici pation Department subseries, 
Government Participation, nywf-nypl.
107 Telegram Holmes to U.S. Embassy in Berlin, 10 January 1938. Ibid.
108 Letter Hogan to Director of Foreign Government Participation, 4 March 1938. Ibid.
109 Letter Standley to von Koop, 11April 1938. Ibid.
110 Letter Standley to Lennox office of the Dir of Foreign Gov Participation, 24 February 1938. 
Ibid. See also Letter Standley to von Koop, 2 February 1938. Ibid.
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status amongst rival nations and past empires alike. Amidst his sensational 
success at Paris, it seems unlikely that Whalen’s team would not have expect-
ed, or even sought out, his input regarding German participation in the New 
York fair. Curiously, though, the written records which prove the organizers’ 
courtship of the Nazi regime, make no mention of Speer, his offices, expecta-
tions, or demands.111 Goebbels, however, along with many lower-ranking 
 officials within his Ministry of Propaganda, is mentioned several times. This 
signals something of a disconnect between the Reich’s cultural and diplomatic 
policy and again betrays the fact that despite its well-publicized ban on propa-
ganda, Whalen’s World’s Fair Corporation was completely aware of the likeli-
hood that certain foreign nations would exploit its venue as a platform from 
which they would be able to further advance their propagandistic, rather than 
artistic designs. It is also possible that that Whalen’s organization, though op-
timistic throughout its dealings in Europe, was simply out of touch. The most 
damning evidence to suggest such a profound disconnect comes in a January 
1937 dispatch from Hartigan to the U.S. Embassy in Berlin wherein he cheer-
fully reports that he has been advised to meet with Professor Mies van der 
Rohe (commonly referred to as Mies), ‘architect of the German Pavilion in 
Paris and the probable person who would do the German participation in our 
fair’.112 No such meeting ever took place, as after nsdap Minister of the Interior 
and Education Wilhelm Frick closed down Mies’ Bauhaus School in 1933 and 
replaced it with one of the more conservative, Party-approved schools raised in 
its stead, the professor had, by the time this letter was sent, already decided to 
leave for the United States and assume a key role at the Armour Institute’s 
School of Architecture in Chicago.113 While a ‘desperate’ Mies had indeed sub-
mitted (unsuccessful) designs for the new Reichsbank in 1933, designed the 
exhibition hall of the 1934 Berlin Deutsches Volk-Deutsche Arbeit exhibition, ac-
cepted an invitation from the president of the Reichskammer der Bildenen Kün-
ste to design the German Pavilion at the Brussels International Exposition of 
1935 (from which the Reich also ultimately withdrew its commitment to 
 participate), and designed several gas stations for Fritz Todt’s new highway sys-
tem, Mies left Germany by the end of 1937, making such participation in 
111 Records of the Federal Foreign Office, R901/106932-7, Bundesarchiv-Lichterfelde, Berlin.
112 Report Hartigan to US Embassy after interview with Dr. Paul Kempner at Jaegerplatz 49, 
Berlin, 13 January 1937. Germany folders, Countries files, Foreign Participation Depart-
ment subseries, Government Participation, nywf-nypl.
113 Magdalena Droste, Bauhaus, 1919–33 (Berlin: Bauhaus-Archiv, 2002), 227.
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 Nazi-sponsored designs for the 1939 fair impossible.114 As there exists no hard 
evidence to suggest Mies’ involvement in the designs for German site at the 
1937 Paris Exposition, it is not unreasonable to interpret this ‘advice’ as cool 
mockery.115 Even without extant architectural plans or sketches, the sheer size 
of the space afforded to Germany suggests that fair organizers expected its par-
ticipation to have been underpinned by one of the event’s more substantial 
structures. Tellingly, the lot which was finally vacated by Germany was so large 
that it came to be occupied by five different countries which otherwise would 
have been excluded from the event in Portugal, Iceland, Haiti, the Dominican 
Republic, and Greece.116
7 Comparative Conclusions
Although the Pact of Steel was signed one month after the opening of the 1939 
World’s Fair on 22 May, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy had been nurturing its 
military alliance for years. With socio-political ‘struggle’ a clear leitmotif of 
both programs, the regimes shared a desire to achieve respectable internation-
al status and managed to find early common ground on the battlefields of 
Spain. On 11 July 1939, the front page of the internationally distributed Welt-
deutscher Beobachter reported colorfully on Count Ciano’s reception in Spain 
and his efforts to advance the status of the Axis powers by establishing the 
“European order sought by Germany and Italy.”117
The regimes shared a common ambition to extend their borders and spheres 
of influence, and though by 1939 they each had managed to do so, such expan-
sion proved costly, both in terms of economic and diplomatic capital. For that 
reason, the ways in which each regime diverted its wealth is also telling.  Despite 
114 Roger Griffin, ‘From Weimar Modernism to Nazi Modernism,’ The German Quarterly 90, 
no. 3 (2017): 361; C. Welsch, ‘Mies van der Rohe’s Compromise with the Nazis,’ Wissen-
schaftliches Kolloquium vom 18. bis 21. Juni 1992 in Weimar an der Hochschule für Archi-
tektur und Bauwesen zum Thema Architektur und Macht, 105; M. Kitchen, Speer, 34.
115 Karen Fiss suggests that Mies van der Rohe ‘may have played a role’ in the design of Ger-
man displays related to medical and chemical equipment at the Paris Expo only to have 
his name struck from the credits. See Fiss, Grand Illusion, 108–109. On Nazi thoughts re-
garding the unsuitability of Bauhaus ‘Stilarchitektur’, see R. Etlin, ‘The Perverse Logic of 
Nazi Thought,’ in Art, Culture, and Media Under the Third Reich, ed. R. Etlin (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2002), 11.
116 ‘Five More Countries Take Fair Space,’ New York Times, 23 May 1938, 19.
117 Unattributed, ‘Spanien steht an der Seite der Achse: Cianos Empfang in Barcelona,’ 
Weltdeutscher Beobachter, 11 July 1939, 1.
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Italy’s sizable (and extremely high-profile) military support of Francoist Spain, 
its own imperial campaigns in Africa, and frequent demonstrations of its new 
air and naval forces (including an extremely popular air display at the 1933 
Chicago Century of Progress Exhibition), it devoted a relatively small amount 
of its gdp to military spending. As Christian Goeschel points out, the regime 
never, at any point, spent more than twenty-two percent of its gdp on arms, 
while Germany steadily increased its military expenditure from forty percent 
in 1940 to sixty-four percent in 1942.118 Yet while the Reich’s highly conspicuous 
absence at the 1939 World’s Fair is indeed suspicious given its behavior in the 
late summer of 1939, the expenses it amassed in sending delegates to and from 
Flushing, paired with its decision to entertain official discussions for well over 
a year suggest that for a time, participation had indeed been a very serious pos-
sibility. Considerably better off in financial terms than its transalpine ally, Ger-
man participation only came to be undermined through a combination of the 
World’s Fair Corporation’s refusal to prove as generous as its French predeces-
sors and the popular American opposition which threatened to further under-
cut the Reich’s public image. Italy, meanwhile, undeterred by what ultimately 
amounted to a multi-million dollar buy-in, was, above all other diplomatic 
considerations, as eager as it had been throughout the earlier fairs to use the 
high-profile platform to further project its strengthened ties to Imperial 
Rome.119 It would spare no expense in proving to the world that Italy had ar-
rived and the Fascist revolution had rendered the culturally well-endowed 
country superiorly capable of war, diplomacy, leisure travel, and scientific or 
technological discovery. Through the established conventions of the regime, 
this relationship was to be animated, mobilized, and deployed through an his-
toriographic and aesthetic material commitment to rebranding and reempha-
sizing, indeed ‘fascistizing’ the classical mode. Within the literal framework of 
the regime’s neoclassical structure, the heft, import, and pan-historic signifi-
cance of the ‘Third Rome’ was to be promoted and reinforced at New York 
through various elements of material culture expected to transcend any orna-
mental role and take on a certain rhetorical function. In the words of a German 
118 Goeschel, Mussolini and Hitler, 179. Goeschel suggests that the German numbers could 
have been exaggerated for effect by the Nazis.
119 Unattributed, ‘Sixty Nations Accept World’s Fair Bids,’ New York Times, 20 December 1937, 
2. For more on the regime’s enthusiastic participation at Chicago in 1934, see Ganz, The 
1933 Chicago World’s Fair, 134.
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press release of April 1938, the Italian pavilion was being built to ‘demonstrate 
progress in all areas of economy and culture.’120
That the Fascist contribution to the New York World’s Fair was already ben-
efitting through an early iteration of the ‘Italiani brava gente’ myth by the time 
Italy had been invited to remain open into the fair’s second year in 1940 is sig-
nificant.121 In some ways, the lack of animosity towards the representation of 
an outwardly bellicose and desperately belligerent Fascist Italy reinforces the 
prevalence of the brava gente idea and suggests just how unthreatening the 
regime was seen through the eyes of the world. Not even after committing so 
many resources to the Francoist cause in Spain, invading Africa, proclaiming 
the reestablishment of the Roman Empire, or withdrawal from the League of 
Nations in a grand gesture of defiance towards what was left of the Wilsonian 
order was enough to draw the casual ire of the fair-going public. With regard to 
foreign opinion, Mussolini’s regime was at its most powerful when dealing in 
cultural terms. Its exhibitionist behavior and the ambassadorial emphasis 
placed on its cultural program by party leaders such as Dino Alfieri demon-
strate that it was acutely aware of this. The string of roughly biennial interna-
tional expositions provided the regime with a regular opportunity to empha-
size such cultural popularity and served to echo the widespread discourses on 
beauty which had become a hallmark of the Fascist brand. Exhibitions permit-
ted the regime to consistently build upon its narrative of monumental great-
ness and document its own process of cultural regeneration. This is illustrated 
quite plainly in its decision to promote its own upcoming international exposi-
tion in the national pavilion built in New York. (Figure 10) Almost paradoxi-
cally, the Fascist emphasis on culture both deflected from and accentuated its 
politics. Yet, put another way, in the words of Hannah Malone, ‘the regime’s 
true culture was always politics.’122
In its major retreat from the stage of international diplomacy furnished by 
the 1939 fair, Nazi Germany made the calculated decision to further alienate 
itself from an increasingly skeptical court of international public opinion, opt-
ing instead to entrench itself even further along the lines of uncooperative and 
120 Draft Press Release of the Deutschen Nachrichtenbüros, 24 April 1938. Records of the Fed-
eral Foreign Office, R901/114753 Bundesarchiv-Lichterfelde, Berlin.
121 For a discussion of the ‘italiani brava gente’ idea and postwar Italian memory politics 
more generally, see Claudio Fogu, ‘Italiani Brava Gente: The Legacy of Fascist Historical 
Culture on Italian Politics of Memory,’ in The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe, ed. Ned 
Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fogu (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 
147–176.
122 Hannah Malone in the opening remarks of the Comparing the Cultural History of Fascist 
Italy and Nazi Germany International Workshop, Freie Universität Berlin, March 2019.
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Figure 10 Unattributed, sketch for ‘Hall of the E42’. 
Source: Italy at the World’s Fair: New York 1939 (Rome:  
Vallecchi, 1939), 7.
expansionist rhetoric. This risk was acknowledged during last-minute discus-
sions about the pros and cons of withdrawal in which some Reich officials 
warned that failure to participate would have permitted ‘the Jewish agitators’ 
to claim that they had ‘beaten the Führer off the track’ and simultaneously 
‘nourish the prejudice that we consciously isolated ourselves from the world.’123 
Yet, its role as pariah was all but confirmed when its demands that the World’s 
Fair Corporation cancel all plans for the construction of a Czechoslovakian 
pavilion were met with public derision. Whalen’s State Department-backed 
defiance of Nazi calls for the immediate sale of the pavilion (to be negotiated 
through the German embassy) in defense of Czech sovereignty was broadly 
interpreted as ‘a notice to Hitler’.124 Significantly, the contract for the Czecho-
slovakian pavilion was not signed until after the Germans had failed to meet 
123 Record of meeting concerning German participation in the exhibition in New York. 
Berlin, 13 April 1938. Records of the Federal Foreign Office, R901/114753 Bundesarchiv- 
Lichterfelde, Berlin.
124 Unattributed, ‘Fair Defies Nazis on Czech Pavilion,’ New York Times 14 April 1939, 6. See 
also, Letter, Holmes to Vseticka, 14 April 1939. Records of the Federal Foreign Office, 
R/901/114754, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde.
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the April 1938 deadline to confirm their participation, raising questions as to 
whether or not the inclusion of a Czech delegation contributed to the Reich’s 
fear of embarrassment or was some sort of Whalen-engineered reprisal for 
Nazi faithlessness.125 In any case, the opening of the 1939 World’s Fair marks 
the closure of many of Germany’s most significant transatlantic diplomatic 
channels.
Conversely, Fascist Italy remained committed to maintaining its ‘Janus face’ 
diplomatic strategy which saw it devote as much careful attention to matters 
of imperialistic militarization as it did cultural policy. Italy remained commit-
ted to this approach until declarations of war in 1941 rendered continuation of 
such a strategy impossible. Until that point, however, the invitations extended 
to each totalitarian regime by a World’s Fair Corporation acting under the aus-
pices of both the executive and legislative branches of the United States gov-
ernment only served to reinforce each regime’s international standing and ef-
fectively legitimize their rule. The differences in foreign opinion of these two 
regimes, especially as related to their cultural output and the social moment 
which facilitated their rise to prominence, deserve further scholarly attention. 
The unduly overlooked world’s fairs of the interwar period represent an excel-
lent place to start.
125 Copy of contract, Records of the Federal Foreign Office, R/901/114754, Bundesarchiv 
Berlin-Lichterfelde.
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